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Lessons from Latvia by Janis Kent
Cakars/Photos by Maris Cakars The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—and the Bush administration’s response to them—have brought the question of nonviolent/unarmed alternatives for defense and conflict resolution closer to the forefront of public discussion. The example of Latvia’s successful nonviolent independence movement in the late 1980s, while not perfectly analogous to the current “war on terrorism,” may serve as a catalyst for a more expansive exploration of that question. In many ways, the Baltic states—Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania—of the late 1980s can be discussed together almost as a unit. Their roads to independence paralleled, crossed and oftentimes overlapped, and cooperation among the three peoples—at an all-time high during the period—certainly aided in their ultimate success. However, variations exist as well. In consideration of both those differences and this magazine’s space limitations, this article focuses on Latvia.
It is significant that the Baltic states did not regain their independence in the wake of the USSR collapse, but before it. The Soviet Union officially recognized Latvia as a fully independent state on September 6, 1991, approximately three months before the Soviet Union dissolved. Latvia was a contributor to, rather than a beneficiary of, Soviet disintegration and it regained its freedom through a remarkably steady and artful application of nonviolent tactics. As political scientist Walter Clemens put it, “Before the late 1980s, no entity so small as the Baltic states had ever managed by its peaceful protests to undermine a large empire.” This is not to say that Latvia won its independence and destroyed the Soviet Union simply by singing. The factors contributing to such momentous political change are, of course, far more complex. But a common perception exists in the West that the Soviet Union was so inherently flawed and unreformable that it just imploded under its own weight, with 15 new countries emerging from the rubble. The Soviet system had deep political, social and economic flaws, but governments do not simply fall apart. The first job of any government is to stay in power, and the Soviet leadership still had considerable resources to help it do so. The Soviet Union did not collapse of weary inefficiency; it was dismantled by people who wanted it abolished, including the Baltic activists who, in the late 1980s, built mass movements that became the most steadfast opponents of Soviet power. Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev cited them as leading the “parade of sovereignties” that hammered the final nail in the Soviet coffin. The Lessons
of History
The Soviet Union occupied the Baltic states in 1940, following an agreement with Germany’s Third Reich that divided up Eastern Europe. The year that followed is known in Latvia simply as “Baigais gads” (the “Horrible Year”) because of the terror and deportations that characterized Soviet rule. Soviet occupation was followed by war, German occupation, the Holocaust and finally Latvia’s reincorporation into the Soviet Union. Latvians waged a guerilla war against the Soviets that lasted into the early 1950s, but its strength was largely sapped by a massive wave of deportations in 1949 that undercut the base of support of the “forest brothers’’ (as the guerrillas were known). In one week in March 1949, about 50,000 Latvians were shipped off to Siberia. For decades afterward, the memory of the guerrilla war and the brutal manner in which it was lost not only served as a symbol of Soviet injustice that inspired independence-seekers, but also provided an important lesson in strategy. Nonviolent action was not applied in the Latvian independence movement simply because no other option existed. The unequal distribution of the tools of violence between independence-seekers and the government was a serious factor, but such imbalances have not dissuaded similar movements. History is full of instances of small groups taking up arms against larger forces. But, as nonviolence theorist Gene Sharp has pointed out, this type of struggle generally leads to disproportionate retaliation by the greater power and excessive casualties among the general population. This was a lesson learned by the Latvians following World War II. From Illegal
Protests … The independence movement was also the heir of a smaller dissident movement. Dissidents are almost by definition nonviolent. When they resort to arms, we tend to call them something else—insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, rebel forces, etc. Seizing opportunities created by glasnost and perestroika, environmentalists and religious groups as well as liberal politicians had scored victories for reform in Latvia, but it was a small dissident group called Helsinki-86 that was the progenitor of the independence movement. Helsinki-86 was formed by three workers in the port city of Liepaja. Several dissidents and former political prisoners soon joined them. The group was ostensibly formed as a watchdog organization to insure the Soviet Union’s compliance with the human rights accords contained in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, to which the Soviet Union was a signatory. In reality, however, Helsinki-86 was a radical organization with an eye on independence. In its letters and protests, Helsinki-86 hammered away at article 69 of the Soviet Latvian constitution that allowed the right—but on paper only—to secede. In one of its first acts, the group wrote to Gorbachev and asked, “Your nation holds unimaginable territory … Do you really need 1.5 million Latvians and a little corner of land by the Baltic Sea?” But Helsinki-86’s most important contribution to the independence movement was its initiation of the “calendar demonstrations.” These protests commemorated important dates in Latvian history, such as the days of the biggest mass deportations, Independence Day, and the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (the Nazi-Soviet agreement that led to the loss of independence). From the start the protests were peaceful. Helsinki-86 urged in 1987: “For possible excess and violence…all responsibility will lie with the authorities.” Yet those early demonstrations were illegal, and participants were subject to harassment and arrest by the local KGB and police. Linards Grantins, a leader of Helsinki-86, spent 11 months in prison between 1986 and 1988. But the rallies grew quickly, culminating most famously in the “Baltic Way” demonstration on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1989. In that protest, two million people joined hands in a human chain from Tallinn, Estonia, to Riga, Latvia, to Vilnius, Lithuania. In 1988, the Latvian Popular Front was formed, and while it did not initially advocate outright independence, it did so by its second congress and ultimately led the independence movement to victory. It was founded as an umbrella organization meant to harness all the various forces calling for change. It was under the Popular Front that a true mass movement was created. The group was indeed diverse. It included members of the Latvian Women’s League, which directly took on the Soviet Army by initiating a massive campaign of draft evasion and a sort of underground railroad to bring army deserters to safety. The Popular Front worked with the Citizens’ Congress, which was involved in setting up an alternate power structure made up of citizens of the pre-war republic and their descendents, and the Latvian Independence Movement, a single-minded group with an uncompromising goal, as well as reformers within the Communist Party. … to ‘Orderly
Dismantling’ A key challenge for the Popular Front was swaying the opinion of non-Latvians, often referred to as Russian-speakers. The proportion of ethnic Latvians in Latvia had shrunk to 52 percent in the postwar period, causing the playwright Mara Zalite to exclaim, “Latvians are presently on the threshold of extinction.” The demographic and linguistic challenge to Latvian culture that Soviet policies had created provided another strong impetus for the advocacy of independence among Latvians, but did not necessarily have the same resonance among Russian-speakers. From the outset, the Popular Front sought to convince the non-Latvians that they would be better off in an independent Latvia. They were successful enough in this effort to sweep local elections in 1989 and elections to the Latvian Supreme Soviet in early 1990. After this success in the polls, nonviolent strategy took a new turn. At the urging of the Women’s League, a law on alternative service for draft-age men was passed, and full independence after a period of transition was declared on May 4, 1990. Now that the movement was settled in power at the republic level, new resources became available to it that could aid in the drive for total independence. But attention also had to be paid to defending what was already won. Earlier in 1990, Popular Front activist Ilmars Latkovskis had urged that “the nonviolent battle must achieve qualitatively new levels.” To that aim, the Latvian Supreme Soviet (now dominated by the Popular Front) created a Nonviolent Defense Center. In December, the Popular Front issued a document providing instructions for the defense of Latvia under two forms of attack: “mild” and “brutal.” It listed specific forms of noncooperation, intervention, protest, and persuasion to be employed by the general population at “Hour X”—the moment of a Soviet attack. In January 1991, Hour X struck in Latvia and Lithuania. On the second day of the month, Soviet special forces occupied the press building in Riga. On January 11, Soviet troops attacked in Vilnius, Lithuania, killing 14 and injuring more than 600. A week later, armed forces stormed the Interior Ministry building in Riga, killing five and injuring about a dozen. On January 14, the Popular Front called the population to the defense of the capital. Barricades were quickly erected to defend key positions in the city. Within two days they were highly organized. Nonviolent defenders worked regular shifts, and each barricade had a commander. Several barricades made up a “sector,” each with its own commander. Independence forces made provisions for food, medical aid and firewood and issued instructions for how to behave in case of internal disorder and in case of chemical, infantry or tank attack. The advance planning of the Popular Front paid off on two counts: The troops withdrew and as many as one fourth of the defenders were not Latvian. Gorbachev denied responsibility for the attack, but remained firm in his opposition to Latvian independence; nevertheless, his legitimacy and that of his government was destroyed. By remaining nonviolent and defending their freedom with bare hands against armed soldiers, the Latvian independence movement had won the sympathy of the world and the allegiance of a resounding majority of the people. But the success of nonviolence during the January Days only proved the need to develop further detailed plans for future engagements against more concerted efforts to deny Latvian freedom. To that aim, the Nonviolent Defense Center published a new, more detailed plan called “The Basic Principles of Nonviolent Defense.” This document envisioned three scenarios: an attempted coup, a successful coup, and a prolonged occupation. Under each circumstance duties were prescribed for three sectors of society: the Latvian government, public institutions, and the general population. The primary goal of the strategy was “to make it impossible for the adversary to control the situation in Latvia.” It included close cooperation with Estonia and Lithuania; mobilization of world opinion; total noncooperation with occupying forces; strikes; public protests; propaganda; blocking of transport, communications and soldiers; and dozens of other methods by which to hinder the invaders’ control of the territory. By the time of the Communist hardliners’ August coup attempt in Moscow (when Soviet troops were called out in Riga again), Latvians had spent five years experimenting with and employing nonviolent tactics as a means to combat Soviet power. Nine months had been spent creating a bona fide strategy of civilian-based defense. When the tanks rolled into Riga in August, those tactics were employed again with a success that stunned the international community. Practical
Nonviolence The Latvian independence movement showed the utility of nonviolent tactics against superior military might and illustrated the promise of civilian-based defense based on strategic planning. The struggle provides an example of nonviolent action that warrants study by anyone concerned with conflict resolution and peace activism. Lessons have been learned in Latvia as well. Civilians are now seen as crucial to defense strategy. Juris Dalbins, vice chairman of the Latvian Parliament’s Defense and Internal Affairs Committee, recently recognized that the military is not always the most effective means of defense. All that matters, he said, is to “hit the target exactly in the middle. That’s what we did in the independence movement.” Janis Kent Cakars holds an MA in Russian and East European Studies from Indiana University, where he is currently a graduate student in the School of Journalism. |
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he
independence movements in Latvia and neighboring Estonia and Lithuania
have gone down in history as the “Singing Revolution.” The appellation
refers to the importance of music to Baltic national identities as well
as to the gargantuan choir festivals, involving thousands of participants,
that turned into defiant rallies against Soviet rule. But the name also
signifies the manner in which independence was achieved: through nonviolent
action. 