July-August 2004:
The RNC & Pacifist Strategy
Sovereignty, U.S. Style
Billions for Arms
Youth & Counter-Recruitment
Where to Go During the RNC
Letters

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War Resisters League
The Nonviolent Activist

Billions for Arms

By Frida Berrigan

reedom is a long way from reigning—or, for that matter, ringing—in Iraq. As detailed on the previous pages, economic, political and, most importantly, military power remain squarely in the hands of the occupation forces, led by the United States.

But one thing was indeed handed back to Iraq in June: the right to buy arms. As part of the “sovereignty” ceremony, the 14-year arms embargo was lifted, so that U.S. weapons manufacturers can get the contracts to arm, equip and train the new Iraqi military and police forces, an announcement that triggered a flurry of excitement among weapons manufacturers. U.S. weapons and U.S. command add up to a disastrous dynamic given Iraq’s volatile mix of ongoing war and occupation, civil strife and stalled political transition.

New Market, Same War
Weapons contracts for the “new Iraq” have been fast and furious. Iraq bought 50,000 Model 19 sidearm handguns in a $19 million contract from the Austrian manufacturer Glock, with an option to purchase an additional 50,000. A shipment of 421 UAZ Hunter jeeps was delivered from Russia; armored cars came in from Brazil and Ukraine.

In March, the Coalition Provisional Authority laid the groundwork for Iraq to purchase C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft, Iroquois helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft which will be delivered by April 2005. U.S. weapons manufacturers shipped tens of thousands of handguns, assault rifles and machine guns to the Iraqi security services in July and August, including 26,000 AK-47 rifles and 4,000 PKM and RPK machine guns.

Money for War, Not for Water
Surely, however, before Iraq is outfitted with high-tech weaponry, the low-tech and more pressing needs for clean water and reliable electricity should be met. While tens of billions have been spent on waging war and outfitting occupation, very little has been allocated for Iraq’s most urgent needs: healthcare, water and sanitation. This disparity in spending sends the wrong message to the Iraqi people. One Iraqi official, speaking anonymously to the Washington Post, said that the occupation authorities “came here and spent a lot of our money but very little of theirs.”

Even the U.S. General Accounting Office was critical of the practice in a report issued to coincide with the transfer of authority. The report underlines that “transparency and accountability” in spending the monies of the Development Fund for Iraq was “essential to assuring Iraqis and the international community that the funds have been used to benefit the Iraqi people.” But, because it took the Provisional Authority a year to hire an external auditor “transactions worth billions of dollars in Iraqi funds have not been independently reviewed or the results reported.”

Who Gets the Money?
Only 6 percent of the funds allocated for Iraq’s national security have been spent. According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, $194 million has been spent on so far on police and military training—out of a planned total budget of $3.2 billion.

Much of that money has gone to U.S. based companies. In June 2003, the Virginia-based Vinnell corporation won a $48 million contract to train nine 900-man troop battalions for the Iraqi army, with an option to continue to train all 27 battalions if the undertaking was successful. It is working with five U.S. subcontractors to fulfill the contract: Military Professional Resources Incorporated, Science Applications International Corporation, Eagle Group International Inc., Omega Training Group and Worldwide Language Resources Inc.

Vinnell is likely to get the renewal despite widespread disappointment about the what it has delivered so far. In an article in the San Diego Union Tribune, Major General Paul Eaton was quoted saying that the program “hasn’t gone well. We’ve had almost a year of no progress.” The U.S. Government Accounting Office backs up his claim, finding that “the new Iraqi civil defense, police and overall security units are suffering from mass desertions, are poorly trained and ill equipped.”

The first desertion happened in December 2003, after the United States balked at paying Iraqi soldiers $70 a month (minimum wage in Iraq). According to the Washington Post, many of those who remained did not have even the most basic skills, such as marching in formation and responding to radio calls.

And then, during the twin outbreaks of violence in April—in Fallujah and between U.S. forces and Moqtada al Sadr’s militias—thousands from the police and security forces deserted and many turned their weapons over to insurgents. Major General Martiun Dempsey, commander of the First Armored Division, told Newhouse News Service that he estimated that one in 10 Iraqi soldiers and police “worked against us.” Afterward, Iraqi and occupation officials promised to purge the ranks of those who collaborated or abandoned their posts. Two months later, that process remained stalled.

New Face, Old Threat?
On top of the problems of training and supplying the new army and police, the central issue is who makes up the military and law enforcement bodies. A new plan by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi to allow former militia members to join Iraq’s national security services almost guarantees that corruption, human rights abuses, and divided loyalties will be the hallmarks of these new bodies. According to an agreement reached between the Interim Iraq Government and leaders of nine political groups with armed factions, 90 percent of some 100,000 forces belonging to these groups would either enter civilian life or one of the Iraqi state security services.

The plan, which has the backing of the Provisional Authority, would open up the armed forces and police service as well as Kurdish internal security agencies to militia members from around the country. Amnesty International raises the concern that some members of these militias that will be incorporated in the Iraqi Armed forces or in the Iraqi Police Services may have been involved in human rights abuses.

Against the backdrop of war profiteering scandals involving companies like Halliburton and Bechtel, the re-arming of Iraq by U.S. companies again raises the question, who is benefiting and who is suffering? One glance at Iraq provides a sobering answer to both.

Frida Berrigan is a Senior Research Associate at the Arms Trade Resource Center of the World Policy Institute and a member of WRL’s National Committee.